Alliance formation in contests with incomplete information / Lars P. Metzger
VerfasserMetzger, Lars P. In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen
ErschienenBochum [u.a.] : RWI, 2015
Umfang39 S. : graph. Darst.
SerieRuhr economic papers ; 544
SchlagwörterSpieltheorie In Wikipedia suchen nach Spieltheorie / Rente In Wikipedia suchen nach Rente / Kooperation In Wikipedia suchen nach Kooperation / Trittbrettfahrerverhalten In Wikipedia suchen nach Trittbrettfahrerverhalten / Online-Publikation In Wikipedia suchen nach Online-Publikation
URNurn:nbn:de:hbz:6:2-47775 Persistent Identifier (URN)
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Alliance formation in contests with incomplete information [0.3 mb]

This paper studies a contest in which players with unobservable types may form an alliance in a pre-stage of the game to join their forces and compete for a prize. We characterize the pure strategy equilibria of this game of incomplete information. We show that if the formation of an alliance is voluntary, players do not reveal private information in the process of alliance formation in any equilibrium. In this case there exists a pooling equilibrium without alliances with a unique eff ort choice in the contest and there exist equilibria in which all types prefer to form an alliance. If the formation of an alliance can be enforced by one player with positive probability