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Titel
Contingent trade policy and economic efficiency / Phillip McCalman, Frank Stähler, Gerald Willmann
VerfasserMcCalman, Phillip ; Stähler, Frank ; Willmann, Gerald
ErschienenBielefeld, Germany : Universität Bielefeld, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Juky 2013
Ausgabe
Elektronische Ressource
Umfang1 Online-Ressource (36 Seiten) : Diagramme
SerieWorking papers in economics and management ; No. 15-2013
SchlagwörterDumpingabwehr / Theorie der strategischen Handelspolitik / Reale Außenwirtschaftstheorie
URNurn:nbn:de:hbz:6:2-128051 
DOI10.4119/unibi/2915414 
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Contingent trade policy and economic efficiency [0.38 mb]
Zusammenfassung

This paper develops an effciency theory of contingent trade policies. We model the competition for a domestic market between one domestic and one foreign firm as a pricing game under incomplete information about production costs. The cost distributions are asymmetric because the foreign firm incurs a trade cost to serve the domestic market. We show that the foreign firm prices more aggressively to overcome its cost disadvantage. This creates the possibility of an inefficient allocation, justifying the use of contingent trade policy on efficiency grounds. Despite an environment of asymmetric information, contingent trade policy that seeks to maximize global welfare can be designed to avoid the potential ineffciency. National governments, on the other hand, make excessive use of contingent trade policy due to rent shifting motives. The expected inefficiency of national policy is larger (smaller) for low (high) trade costs compared to the laissez-faire case. In general, there is no clear ranking between the laissez-faire outcome and a contingent national trade policy.

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