Evolutionary stability in asymmetric oligopoly : a non-Walrasian result / Wolfgang Leininger and Hamed M. Moghadam
VerfasserLeininger, Wolfgang In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen ; Moghadam, Hamed In der Gemeinsamen Normdatei der DNB nachschlagen
ErschienenBochum [u.a.] : RWI, 2014
Umfang20 S. : graph. Darst.
SerieRuhr economic papers ; 497
SchlagwörterCournotsches Dyopol In Wikipedia suchen nach Cournotsches Dyopol / Marktgleichgewicht In Wikipedia suchen nach Marktgleichgewicht / Online-Publikation In Wikipedia suchen nach Online-Publikation
URNurn:nbn:de:hbz:6:2-42290 Persistent Identifier (URN)
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Evolutionary stability in asymmetric oligopoly [0.31 mb]

It is a very well-known result that in terms of evolutionary stability the long-run outcome of a Cournot oligopoly market with finitely many firms approaches the perfectly competitive Walrasian market outcome (Vega-Redondo, 1997). However, in this paper we show that an asymmetric structure in the cost functions of firms may change the long-run outcome. Contrary to Tanaka (1999) we show that the evolutionarily stable price in an asymmetric Cournot oligopoly needs not equal the marginal cost, it may rather equal a weighted average of (different) marginal cost. We apply a symmetrization technique in order to transform the game with asymmetric firms into a symmetric oligopoly game and then extend Schaff ers definition (1988) of a finite population ESS (FPESS) to this setup. Moreover, we show that the FPESS in this game represents a stochastically stable state of an evolutionary process of imitation with experimentation.